Richard H. Mortensen and Alfred Tredway v. Life Insurance Corporation of America et al : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1957
Richard H. Mortensen and Alfred Tredway v. Life
Insurance Corporation of America et al : Brief of
Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Clyde & Mechan; Attorney for Respondents;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Mortensen v. Life Insurance Corporation of America, No. 8551 (Utah Supreme Court, 1957).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/2650
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
I ~· -C' T").·· F L £A _L. 
RICHARD H. MORTENSEN, ~) 4. - 'i9S7 
and ALFRED TREDWAY, 
Respondent-s----· -- - · ----·------------ -r-_-- .. ~ ---"' 
' CJ · C rt • ·,... ·-
. ~ · uupre:rne . ou ~ • 
-vs.-
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORA-
TION OF AMERICA, a Utah 
corporation; CLEO H. 
BULLARD, and RICHARD 
DON CAFFERTY, 
Appellants. 
Case 
No. 8551 
Respondents' Brief 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD H. 1\IORTENSEN, 
and ALFRED TREDWAY, 
Respondents, 
-vs.-
LIFE INSURANCE CORPORA-
TION OF AMERICA, a Utah 
corporation; CLEO H. 
BULLARD, and RICHARD 
DON CAFFERTY, 
Appellants. 
Case 
No. 8551 
Respondents' Brief 
NATURE OF CASE 
This appeal was taken by the defendants from a 
judgment of the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County. The action was one for libel brought 
by Richard H. Mortensen and Alfred B. Tredway against 
Life Insurance Corporation of America, Cleo H. Bul-
lard and Richard Don Cafferty. The judgment for dam-
ages in favor of plaintiffs was based upon a jury verdict. 
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The ongguestioP.,!-:~~sed by Jhe ap;eeal is al que~on 
of privilege. The appellants contend that statements 
···s ·~ 
made to the Commissioner of Insurance about the plain-
tiffs are so privileged that no liability can attach to them 
even though the statements were false, defamatory, and 
malicious. 
DESIGNATION OF PARTIES 
The plaintiffs-respondents, Richard H. Mortensen 
and Alfred B. Tredway, shall hereinafter be referred to 
as ''Mortensen'' and Tredway,'' respectively. 
The defendants-appellants, Life Insurance Corpora-
tion of America, Cleo H. Bullard and Richard Don Caf-
ferty, shall hereinafter be referred to as "Licoa," "Bul-
lard'' and ''Cafferty,'' respectively. 
Respondents feel that an understanding of the cir-
cumstances is necessary in order for the court to reach 
a decision, and therefore, the facts of the case are here 
presented with more detail than in appellants' brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
LICOA, BULLARD AND CAFFERTY, DELIBER-
ATELY AND MALICIOUSLY LIBELED ~!ORTEN­
SEN AND TREDWAY, FOR THE EXPRESS PUR-
POSE OF PROHIBITING MORTENSEN .A.ND 
TREDWAY FROM SECURING EMPLOYMENT 
WITH OTHER INSURANCE COMPANIES. 
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Mortensen and Tredway were career insurance sales-
men, who, while employed- by -Licoa, applied for a better 
position with another insurwnce company. 
In October of 1954, Mortensen and Tredway were 
working for Licoa in the capacity of insurance salesmen. 
Both Mortensen and Tredway had for several years been 
engaged in the profession of selling insurance, which was 
their principal means of earning a living. Bullard was 
then president of Licoa, and Cafferty was its general 
sales manager. (R-1,4; Ex. 18) 
Some time during the first week of October, 1954, 
Mortensen and Tredway approached Frank B. Salisbury, 
president of Reliance National Life Insurance Company, 
seeking employment with that company. Reliance Nation-
al Life Insurance Company was just starting business 
and was in need of administrative officers. At this first 
meeting the possibility of Mortensen and Tredway serv-
ing as joint agency directors over all sales personnel of 
the company was discussed. Such a position would have 
given Mortensen and Tredway a commission on all 
Insurance sold by Reliance National Life Insurance 
Company. (R-93, 94, 100) 
Salisbury wanted to investigate Mortensen and 
Tredway thoroughly before entrusting them with such 
an important position. This he did, and at a meeting h_elg 
----- --· '""---'--~·~"- ------ ·- ' 
about a week later Salisbury reported that he was well 
. ,...... «zr'Atm . 1 ~~ ... '-~)~·.:rt~~.o.:&:IJ"• fiOdl"'. -·r~.AlA'~h<J-~ 
satisfied with the results of his investigation. The terms 
-- ~-;or.,-; •. --~-~,_,, __ . -~~'-'-•-"""''''""'~~;u,,,;:w~-""'"""119,. 
of a joint agency director's contract were discussed. A 
--- f'D!" ·- 0 ~·-···--•, ··-··'·~~_,&~-· •- """"""""'-'"'~hl~jillfolil!iii!JIIfl.lltl~K~ 
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third meeting was_ agreed U:Q~n- to pu~. ,the . terms of the 
4 Pi ucww: zw;;:s.,f'"' .-.-.. - . ~m"!',. . r·""·~~~.o:-'1<.~ ... -~!J'll: . "'-~~.u.!)J,ffoJ'~~~ 
contract in writing. (R-93, 94, 95) 
"t'*r-.~~ 
Upon discovering that Mortensen and Tredway were 
negotiating for a better position with Salisbury, defend-
ants-appellants announced that they would prohibit 
Morten.sen a.nd Tredway from selling insurance for a;ny 
other insurance company. 
Cafferty learned that Mortensen and Tredway were 
negotiating with Salisbury, reported this fact to Bullard 
{R-160), and boasted to the personnel of Licoa that 
Mortensen andfi;a;ayWOlild never be ahle to ~;ll 
~~r &( ~-.;,._ 't?'i' - - --- r Jt7ir1r~ ,, :,.,;.·>,_ • ....,_. 
Insurance for any other company. (R-117) 
~ . ... ...._, ~, ..... -- J"'h3~- - - ... --- otzC:C;-wa.r c- -- - -~.., --.,.....,;3-.. ~~ 
Around the middle of October, 1954, Cafferty, speak-
ing of Mortensen and Tredway, made the following state-
ment to Rowe Fielding, at that time an insurance agent 
for Licoa: 
''Well, I don't know I would get in with those fel-
lows because they won't be writing insurance busi-
ness after the next ten days. They won't write in 
this or any other state when we get through 
with them." {R-73) (Italics supplied) 
At about the same time Cafferty, speaking of :htior-
tensen and Tredway, told Howard Saunders, another em-
ployee of Licoa, that he (Cafferty) : 
''Was getting rid of them, and they had stolen 
some of his materials and been double-dealing him, 
in a short time he did not expect them to be in the 
insurance business.'' ( R-7 4) 
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During the first week in October, 1954, Cafferty told 
Wallace Stephensen, a Licoa salesman, that he was going 
to have plaintiff's licenses canceled with prejudice, 
adding: 
''I am going to get them out of the insurance bus-
iness. I don't 'lvan.t them to sign insurance in Ut'h 
or any other state." (Italics supplied) (l( ... fs, 7 
Bullard also complained to Saunders that Morten-
sen and Tredway had wrongfully taken materials be-
longing to Licoa and were using them to earn a living in 
competition with Licoa. (R-79, 80) 
Letters discrediting plaintiffs were solicited by de-
fendands from persons to whom plaintiffs had sold 
insurance, and Gaff erty bribed an insurance salesman. to 
write a letter containing false derogatory statements con-
cerning Tredway. 
While Mortensen was employed by Licoa he sold ·a 
policy to Shirley Leyshon Averett and her husband. The 
Averetts, subsequently having decided that they could 
not afford the policy, canceled payment on the check they 
had given Mortensen, and wrote Licoa of their decision, 
assigning as their . sole reason for not takin_g t!!5~ .. p()li_cy 
the.aaticf'tllatlney could not"afford it. (R~236) Thereafter, 
~~~X.:?"".r...::V"V""_..t..~ n ... - ~ f~· • ~ ~···t'm•t: !It\\!~ ... ·t--~~~ 
a representative of Licoa visited the Averett home sev-
eral times for the purpose of getting Mr. Averett to write 
. . 
a letter to the company concerning Mortensen. (R-2371 
Finally, Mr:.. Av~r~~t~)v~~~.·- p~suaded ·J~~~e ~_Jetter, 
as dictated to him by the ~~~, repr_es.0ntfJJiyre~. (~-,238)_ 
The representative stated he wanted the letter because: 
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''there had been several complaints about Mr. 
Mortensen, and he had been misrepresenting 
things in the contract, and he wanted us to write 
the letter.'' ( R-239) 
During the first week of October, 1954, Cafferty also 
had approached Wallace Stephensen and offered him 
$100.00 for a favor. Stephensen, a recent employee of 
Licoa, was then only 21 years old and had never before 
been employed in the insurance business. (R-44) About 
two weeks later Cafferty told Stephensen that the de-
sired favor was a letter from Stephensen to Bullard con-
taining derogatory statements about Tredway. The state-
ments sought were known by both Cafferty and Stephen-
sen to be false. Cafferty said 
''he wanted the letter to back up his claim to can-
cel the licenses with prejudice.'' (R-59) 
The following is taken from Stephensen's testimony 
at the trial: 
Q. What brought about the discussion about 
Mr. Mortensen and Mr. Treadway1 
A. Well the first time that Mortensen and 
rrreadway were discussed was in Provo right after 
we had returned from a trip to Richfield, and Mr. 
Cafferty and I were sitting in his automobile on 
Main street in Provo, and Mr. Cafferty asked me 
if I '\\~ould like to make $100.00. I told him I would . 
. A.t that time he did not tell me 'vhat it was he 
'van ted me to do. It "~as later, oh some two or three 
'veeks later, when "re 'vere in the Riverside Motel 
in Provo, where we were staying, and l\1r. Cafferty 
and I and a few of the other fellows were in the 
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room, and any way they all left, and I and he were 
together. 
He asked me to do thhis little favor for him 
he had asked me ten days or two weeks earlier to 
that date, and I said I would. I asked him what 
he wanted me to do. He said he wanted me to write 
a letter to Mr. Bullard, president of Life Insur-
ance Corporation of America, and he asked me if 
I had worked-he knew I had worked with Tred-
way in Price, Utah, and Helper and that-he asked 
me if I went out on any contact or presentation 
with them, when I did, seeing I was the youngest 
salesman started, about my first two weeks with 
the company. 
Anyway, he got the typewriter out and paper 
and everything and I asked him what he wanted 
me to write. He told me he had terminated Mor-
tensen and Tredway's licenses with the company, 
with prejudice, and that he wanted me to write a 
letter to the president stating a few facts I had 
observed while working with them in Helper and 
Price. 
I told him I did not kno~v what to write, there 
wasn't anythin~q derogatory, anything wrong. He 
said, ''I will tell you what to write,'' so I wrote 
the letter, dictated to me by Mr. Cafferty." (R-45, 
46) (Italics supplied) 
Q. To the best of your recollection, give us 
what he dictated~ 
A. The letter said that I, being an employee 
of the Life Insurance Corporation of America, 
with the company, full hearted and everything, 
that I had noticed a few things in Price and Provo 
among two agents, Mortensen-not Mortensen, ex-
cuse me, Tredway-and that he had offered to re-
bate part of his commission to one of his clients or 
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fellows he was presenting this insurance policy to, 
and that he had misrepresented the contract in 
many phases and instances, and that he had-
after his termination, had offered to induce me to 
leave the company and go to work for him as a 
licensed agent with Reliance National. 
Q. Did you willingly type this letter? 
A. Not at :first, no I didn't. I didn't want 
to write it, but seeing how I was going with 
the company and work for the company - being 
an employee of Mr. Cafferty, I assumed that I was 
supposed to do what I was told to do, ..... . 
Q. Had you ever seen Tredway do anything 
that you alleged in the letter~ 
A. No. (R-47, 48) 
On October 11, 1954, Mortensen and Tredway re-
signed as agents of Licoa. (R-1, 178) On October 15, 1954, 
Bullard sent to the Insurance Commissioner a written_ 
notice canceling J.l! ortensen' s and Tredway's licenses 
with Licoa. The notice of cancellation contained derogar 
tory statements wh·ich were not sufficient to cause the 
Insurance Commissioner to take affirmative action 
against Mortensen and Tredway, but were sufficient to 
cause other insurance companies to refu,se to hire them. 
(R-89, 312, 313, 315) 
On October 11, 1954, }fortensen and Tredway re-
signed as agents of Licoa. (R-1, 178) On October 15, 
1954, Bullard sent a written notice to the Insurance 
Commissioner of the State of Utah canceling, among 
others, the licenses of Mortensen and Tredway. The par-
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agraph referring to Mortensen and Tredway states as 
follows: 
"Also please cancel with prejudice the licenses of 
Alfred B. Tredway and R. H. Mortensen, whose 
actions were not in the best interests of the Com-
pany. Our books indicate an agency debit of $89.75 
on R. H. Mortensen and $428.00 on A. B. Tred-
way." (R-1, 4) 
The derogatory statements in this paragraph were 
not sufficient to cause the Insurance Commissioner to take 
any affirmative action against either Mortensen or Tred-
way, other than cancel their licenses with Licoa, which 
the commissioner would have had had to do even if no 
derogatory language had been used. ( R-120, 126, 127 ; 
31-17-10, U.C.A., 1953) However, the statements were 
sufficiently derogatory in nature to cause other insur-
ance companies to refuse to hire either Mortensen or 
Tredway. ( 89, 312, 313, 315) 
AT THE TIME OF THE TRIAL, DEFENDANTS-
APPELLANTS DID NOT OFFER ANY EVIDENCE 
TO JUSTIFY THE REQUEST THAT MORTENSEN'S 
AND TREDWAY'S LICENSES BE CANCELED 
"WITH PREJUDICE," NOR TO SHOW THAT MOR-
TENSEN'S AND TREDWAY'S ''ACTIONS WERE 
NOT IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE COMPANY.'' 
Cafferty, although present during the entire trial, 
did not refute the testimony that he bribed Stephensen 
to write a letter about Tredway containing derogatory 
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statements which both Cafferty · arnd Stephensen knew 
to be false. Bullard did not appear at the trial . 
. To support its allegations of debit balances for lJfor-
tensen and Tredway as of October 15, 1954, the date of 
the notice of cancellation of their licenses, Licoa deprived 
Mortensen of an earned commission for the sale of life 
insurance policy, and charged Tredway for an amount 
which was not due for approximately six months after 
said date, and then was payable to Cafferty am,d not to 
Licoa. 
An account of an insurance agent with an insurance 
company is in a constant state of fluctuation. It is ex-
tremely difficult to say at any one time exactly 'vhat the 
balance is, and a final balance can be determined only 
after a lapse of time when the plus and minus of paid 
prem1ums and canceled policies has been established. 
(R-123) 
On October 15, 1954, four days after Mortensen and 
Tredway had resigned {R-1, 4) the above quoted notice 
of cancellation listed debit balances for both lVIortensen 
and Tredway. 
In order to justify the debit balance for Mortensen, 
it wa's ~ece~~~!Y for_Licoa t<? __ ~-~-prive him of an earn~ 
c~mmi~~i~I! for. -~-~e ,!1.!1~-- o~-a li~~-~~~~ra~~: ~~!~~! _:h~~~-
·he h~q,.~pld. ~h1s was done by crossn1g out ~Iortensen 's_ 
- ...... . ..... ·- .. ----··""- '" ....... -~~___.,. .... :-."''~ 
n~m~.2.n al!..!_P,Plication -~or __ ~ .p.,~~<j i!fd substit~!~ 
name of Cafferty. (Ex. 22; fl:) ~he commission was 
-'-1 .... 1....,,;1 . ~- .. ·-·-- ·•. ' •. -~ 
then credited to Cafferty {R-379, 380, 360, 361, 372, 373, 
10 
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374) The office manager for Licoa, Frank Schmidt, testi-
fied that if Mortensen had been credited with the com-
mission for this sale he would have a credit balance of 
$110.20 as of October 15, 1954. (R-392, 393) 
Some time during the first part of Octo her, 1954, 
Treadway borrowed $500.00 from Licoa through Cafferty. 
On October 11, 1954, the date Tredway resigned, he 
(Tredway) signed a note for this $500.00, the note being 
payable to Cafferty, personally. (Ex. 2) The $500.00 
was charged to Cafferty's account by Licoa, and Cafferty 
testified that he subsequently repaid it to Licoa. Accord-
ing to its terms, the note was not due until six months 
after date. (R-175, 176, 178) 
In order to show a debit balance for Tredway on 
October 15, 1954, Licoa charged Tredway with the $500.00 
advance, represented by the note that had been executed 
by Tredway only four days previously, and which 'vas 
not due for almost six months. The notice of cancella-
tion alleges a debit balance of $428.00 as of October 15, 
1954, for Tredway. If the note had not been counted in 
determining this debit balance, Tredway would have had 
a credit of $72.00 as of that date. 
The records of the Insurance Commission of the 
State of Utah are public. (31-2-4, U.C.A., 1953) T'he above 
quoted notice of cancellation was read by Salisbury, who 
then refused to hire Mortensen and Tredway in the ca-
pacity of agency directors. 
11 
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About three or four days after his second meeting 
with Mortensen and Tredway, Salisbury received a tele-
phone call from Mrs. Burns, an employee of the office of 
the Insurance Commissioner, State of Utah, informing 
Salisbury of the derogatory contents of the notice of 
cancellation sent the commission by Licoa. Salisbuy sub-
sequently went to the commission offices and read the 
letter. ( R-96, 97) 
At a third meeting, Salisbury told Mortensen and 
Tredway that in view of the derogatory statements con-
tained in the Licoa notice of cancellation he would be 
unable to hire them in the capacity of agency directors 
as previously contemplated. They were subsequently 
hired as general agents with limited jurisdiction. 
(R-98, 103) 
AS A RESULT OF LOSING THE .£-L\.GENCY DIREC-
TOR'S POSITION, MORTENSEN AND TREDWAY 
SUFFERED A LOSS OF $20,377.07 IN COMMIS-
SIONS. (R-258, 259) IN ADDITION, TREDWAY 
WAS SUBSEQUENTLY UNABLE TO GAIN EM-
PLOYJ\!IENT IN THE INSURANCE BUSINESS 
(R-89, 213, 214), AND MORTENSEN WAS FORCED 
TO MOVE TO LAS VEGAS, NEVADA, IN ORDER TO 
ENGAGE IN HIS PROFESSION AS AN INSURANCE 
SALESMAN. (R-191) 
After considering the above evidence, the jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of Mortensen and Tredway 
and against Licoa, Bullard and Cafferty in the sum of 
$8,500.00. 
12 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS ENJOY 
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGE ONLY IN JUDI-
CIAI.J AND LEGISLATIVE PROCEED-
INGS, PROCEEDINGS OF EXECUTIVE 
OFFICERS CHARGED WITH RESPONSI-
BILITY OF IMPORTANCE, AND COMMU-
NICATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND 
WIFE. (Prosser on Torts, Hornbook Series, 
2d Ed., par. 95, p. 606) 
2. IN REVOKING MORTENSEN'S AND 
TREDWAY'S LICENSES WITH LICOA 
THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER WAS 
MERELY PERFORMING A MINISTER-
IAL DUTY, IN WHICH HE WAS GIVEN 
NO DISCRETION, AND THE CONTENTS 
OF THE REVOCATION NOTICE WERE 
ONLY QUALIFIEDLY OR CONDITION-
.6-J\.LLY PRIVILEGED. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I 
DEFATh1ATORY STATEMENTS ENJOY AB-
SOLUTE PRIVILEGE ONLY IN JUDICIAL 
AND LEGISLATIVE PROCEEDINGS, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF EXECUTIVE OFFICERS 
CHARGED WITH RESPONSIBILITY OF IM-
PORTANCE, AND COMMUNICATIONS BE-
TWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. (Prosser on 
Torts, Hornbook Series, 2d Ed., par. 95, p. 606) 
Affording a shield of absolute privilege to the author 
of defamatory statements so that character and earning 
capacity may be destroyed without fear of retribution 
13 
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is extremely dangerous to society and to the individual 
members thereof. For this reason absolute privilege is 
a defense only in those cases where public policy dictates 
that the public good outweighs the harm that may be done 
to any one individual. Thus, public policy has defended 
with the shield of absolute privilege defamatory state-
ments made in judicial and legislative proceedings, pro-
ceedings of executive officers charged with responsibility 
of importance, and communications between husband and 
wife. (Prosser on Torts, Hornbook Series, 2d Ed., par. 
95, p. 606) However, the courts have been extremely re-
luctant to extend the protection of this privilege beyond 
the limits stated. 
The policy of extending the defense of absolute privi-
lege was discussed in the case of Tanner v. Stevenson, 
128 S.W. 878, 138 Ky. 578, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 200, and 
quoted by the Court in the case of Bonham v. Dotson, 288 
"\ 
S.W. 297, 216 Ky~ 660. We quote from 288 S.W. at 
page 298: 
''The cases to which this privilege applies are few 
in number and ought not to be enlarged. It would 
be a dangerous and vicious thing to license people 
to write atnd speak without any restrainf-There are 
many evil minded and recklessly disposed who 
tvould shelter i.f they could under the protection 
afforded by absolute privilege and give f'ree bridle 
to tongue and pen to injure or destroy an enemy. 
=lf: "" * The law holds good character in high esteem, 
and has made it a serio~us o ffen.se to U)antordy 
assault it; but there are a few instances in which 
the interest of the public is esteemed more impor-
tant than that of the individual, and ocea.sions in 
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which private rights must yield to public good. 
In these cases there is no penalty attached to 
malice or falsehood .... But the cases to which 
this immunity from liability applies are confined 
to judicial and legislative proceedings, matters 
involving military affairs, and communications 
made in the discharge of a duty under express 
authority of law by or to heads of executive de-
partments of state." (Italics added) 
In the Tanner case the county superintendent of 
schools had written a defamatory letter to the state su-
perintendent of public instruction concerning a school 
teacher who was seeking to obtain a state certificate in 
the effort to prevent her from so doing, and it was 
held that such communication was not absolutely privi-
leged. (See also Ranson v. West, 125 Ky. 457, 101 S.W. 
885, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 82) 
There have been a multitude of cases that have re-
fused to extend the defense of absolute privilege beyond 
the boundaries above listed. For the convenience of the 
court we quote from a few such decisions. 
In the case of Hancock v. lJfitchell, 98 S.E. 65, 83 
W. V a. 15~, the def en dan t had circulated a petition seek-
ing to establish a temporary road and further seeking to 
remove the road engineer for ''incompetency and for 
misfeasance and malfeasance in office.'' The defendant 
then filed the petition in the county court. It was held 
that this petition was protected only by a conditional or 
qualified privilege, and not by an absolute privilege. Par-
agraphs 1 and 2 of the Syllabus (quoting from the opin-
15 
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ion of the court, Vol. 98, page 66 of the South Eastern Re-
porter) state as follows: 
1. A citizen having an interest in the due and 
proper performance of the duties of a public 
officer or agent may petition the tribunal ap-
pointing such officer or agent and having 
power to remove him, for his removal, with-
out liability for false or erroneous representa-
tions made therein as ground for removal, pro-
~id2<!_t~,.-~~r~--,~~~-~--}~-~ood fai!4 forTe 
purpose aforesaid and without malice an'd 
' _ '--~~ u-..:.. ....... _.,----·····-·•·-·, 0 • • 0 ,_ 4 -# -.,.-...,.-,_~· .~ •· ... ~ knowledge of their -urifrullifulness, __ even 
tliough heliaS'lli>ngiit 'to prosec-ute th; r~ 
moval proceeding as a party litigant, and he 
may set up such right as a qualified or condi-
tional privilege by way of defense in an action 
against him for libel, based upon allegations 
of false and malicious representations con-
tained in his petition. 
2. Such right raises a presumption of good faith 
in the preparation, circulation, and presenta-
tion of the petition, which precludes right of 
recovery, in the absence of allegation and 
proof of express malice therein; but it does 
not constitute an absolute priv·ilege, absolving 
the petitioner from liability without regard to 
his motives and conduct. 
In the case of Walker v. Hunter, et al., 283 P. 48, 86 
Colo. 483, the defendants petitioned the Board of County 
Commissioners t<_? revoke plaintiff's license to operate 
a dance hall. The ~ourt held that this petition was quali-
fiedly o~ conditionally privileged. Paragraphs 1 and 2 
------- - _, - -
of the syllabus state as follo,vs: 
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1. Board of county commissioners having full 
power to grant, refuse, revoke, and cancel 
dance hall licenses, under Laws 1927, p. 577, 
petition to deny license to and close dance 
hall, because ''the management, conduct and 
existing immoral conditions'' thereof ''are 
such that said dance hall has become a public 
nuisance and a detriment to the community,'' 
was qualifiedly privileged. 
2. To deprive a qualifiedly or conditionally priv-
iledged publication of such character, it must 
appear that it was made with express malice. 
In the case of Colonial Stores, Inc. v. Barrett, 38 S.E. 
2d 306, 73 Ga. App. 839, there was a regulation of the 
War Manpower Commission requiring an employer to 
give a discharged employee a certificate of availability. 
The defendant gave the plaintiff a certificate of availa-
bility stating that plaintiff was discharged because of 
''improper conduct toward fellow employees.'' The 
court held that there was only a conditional privilege. 
Paragraph 8 of the syllabus states as follows: 
8. In action against plaintiff's former emloyer 
for libel in falsely stating in certificate of 
plaintiff's availability, required to be pre-
sented by him to prospective employers, that 
he was discharged by defendant because of 
improper conduct toward fellow employees, 
evidence was sufficient to authorize jury's 
finding of defendant's malice, so as to justify 
verdict for plaintiff, even if certificate was 
conditionally privileged.'' 
17 
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PoiNT II 
IN REVOKING ~IORTENSEN'S AND TRED-
WAY'S LICENSES WITH LICOA THE IN-
SURANCE COMMISSIONER WAS MERELY 
PERFORl\tiiNG A MINISTERIAL DUTY, IN 
WHICH HE WAS GIVEN NO DISCRETION, 
AND THE CONTENTS OF THE REVOCA-
TION NOTICE WERE ONLY QUALIFIEDLY 
OR CONDITIONALLY PRIVILEGED. 
American Juris prudence, volume 33, page 124, par. 
126, gives the following discussion of qualified or condi-
tional privilege : 
''A publication is co_ndiJiol}~~ or qualifiedly 
privileged where 2i!cumstances exist, or are rea-
sonably believed by the dePendant to e:nst, wlhc1i 
cast on liim.iheduty O'f~w~!_i;~i~~.~~~i~i£_ation to k 
a certain other person to wh9m he_ makes sl1cfi 
communigatjon __ IP..:iK~~P~rf1>!~a~~-~r_· such dutr: 
or where the person is so situate({ that ·It HbecOmes 
right in the interests of society that he should 
tell third persons certain facts, which he in good 
faith proceeds to do. This general idea. has been 
otherwise expressed as follows : A communica-
tion made in good faith on any subject matter in 
which the person communicating has an interest, 
or in reference to which he has a duty, is privi-
leged if made to a person having a corresponding 
interest or duty, eYen though it contains matter 
which, without this privilege, ",.ould be actionable, 
and although the duty is not a legal one, but only a 
moral or social duty of imperfect obligation. The 
essential elements of a. conditionally privileged 
communication may accordingly be enumerated as 
good faith, an interest to be upheld, a statement 
limited in its scope to this purpose, a proper occa-
18 
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sion, and publication in a proper manner and to 
proper parties only. The privilege arises from 
the necessity of full and unrestricted communica-
tion concerning a matter in which the parties have 
an interest or duty, and is not restricted 'vithin 
any narrow limits. 
qualf£~~~~~feii~.£!~ui,~}fl!~~~~:e,~ 
and notwithstanding th~-- fact thai, i~utain§.~ __ a_~ 
charge oJ crilll:~· Indeed, it has been said that the 
doctrine of privilege rests usually, if not always, 
on the assumption that the words were untrue, but 
were excused by the occasion and the circum-
stances. But mere color of lawful occasion and 
pretense of justifiable end cannot shield from lia-
bility a person who publishes and circulates de-
fama.tory ·matter. Hence, !!:__f!'!!:J:.lica~i<l~!".-l.f2~~~~.,.'it§ 
c_haracter as .· .rivife ,i11d.~ ... D!J101J!:(k]!Tf:.1 -flf!{. 
aq,!! .. "~2Ltfi!uat_mqlf2.fJ· (Italics added) 
Appellants do not contend that the publication ~aq~ 
by them concernin,g,fl!.~~ndey!~-F..!~ .. Pot defllll!.torx,_ 
false and malicious. The only contention of the appellants 
---------is that the publication was absolutely privileged. Re-
spondents take the position that if any privilege attached 
to the publication of the appellants, that privilege was 
only qualified or conditional, and was lost when the 
publication was made with express malice. 
To support their contention appellants cite two Ten-
nessee cases, Independent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 55 
S.W. 2d 767, 165 Tenn. 447; and Independent Life Ins. Co. 
v. Hlunter, 63 S.W. 2d 668. These are companion cases 
arising out of the same publication of the defendant com-
pany, Independent Life Ins. Co. (plaintiff on appeal). 
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In the Tennessee cases Independent Life Ins. Co. 
wrote a letter to the Insurance Commissioner which 
was a ''charge against Rodgers going to his eligibility 
to work for the Federal Union Company," and also mak-
ing charges against Hunter's eligibility to go to work 
for any other company. Both men had been employees of 
Independent Life Ins. Co., but had left that company. 
Chapter 46 of Public Acts of 1925 (Tennessee) con-
tains the following provision: 
''Section 1. . ... That every insurance company, 
including fraternal benefit associations, and all 
other companies licensed to do business in this 
State, shall obtain from the said Commissioner of 
Insurance and Banking a certificate of authority 
for every agent or solicitor writing or soliciting 
insurance for them as now provided in this State, 
and that such certificate shall be renewable in 
January of each year, and that the same may be 
revoked after a hearing for good cause shown by 
said Commissioner of Insurance and Banking .... '' 
The Tennessee court interpreted this section as per-
mitting an insurance company to bring a charge against 
an agent on which a hearing would have to be held, and 
that if the company could sho\v "good· cause," the 
agent's license would be revoked by the Insurance Com-
. . 
miSSIOner. 
Thus, in the Rodgers case, the Court held that: 
''The letter (from Independent Life Ins. Co.) was 
understood by the commissioner as a charge 
against Rodgers going to his eligibility to work 
20 
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for the Federal Union Company. We interpret 
the letter likewise." (55 S.W. 22d 769) 
On this basis the Tennessee court held that in the 
Rodgers case the publication was absolutely privileged. 
However, in the Hunter case, based on the identical 
letter to the Insurance Commissioner, the court held 
that as Hunter was not working for another company 
and therefore was not licensed for another company, the 
letter did not come under the above statute, and Hunter 
was allowed to recover. 
In the case of Grubb v. Johnson, 89 P. 2d 1067, decid-
ed Nov. 23, 1955, where the identical fact situation was 
presented as in the instant case, the Oregon court dis-
cussed both the Rodgers and the Hunter case at length. 
Regarding the Rodgers case the Court said (p. 1072, P. 
2d reports) : 
"The next case cited by the defendants is Inde-
pendent Life Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 165 Tenn. 447, 
55 S.W. 2d 767, 768. The plaintiff was an agent 
in the employ of the insurance company. He left 
the employment and thereafter he secured from 
the commissioner of insurance a license to sell 
insurance for another company. After the second 
license had been issued the defendant company 
wrote to the insurance commissioner, stating that 
the plaintiff 
'took things into his own hands and collect-
ed his money before a final had been made 
against him and before we had time to 
check up and see how much he is short, but 
it will be slight, but we understand that he 
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is going to work for the Federal Union of 
Cincinnati, Ohio, and is going to work in 
Chattanooga. 
* * * * * * 
'* * * we procured licenses for these 
men and paid for them, and we think prob-
ably it will be plenty of time for them to go 
to work for some other company when they 
have a clean bill of health from us.' 
We have grave doubt whether the letter was li-
belous per se, but the Tennessee court so held. 
The court then construed the letter as a charge 
against the plaintiff going to his eligibility to 
work for the new company. On receipt of the de-
fendant's letter the commissioner notified the 
plainteiff thereof and 'asked for his explanation.' 
Whether a hearing was had, or with what results, 
does not appear. On appeal the court held in sub-
stance that the commissioner was acting as a court 
and that the defendant's letter was absolutely 
privileged. We are un.able to follow its reasoning. 
(Italics added) 
The Grubb v. Johnson case was identical with the 
case at bar. In discussing the Grubb case the Oregon 
court was not only unable to follow the reasoning of 
the Tennessee court in the Rodgers case, but also distin-
guished the Grubb case from the Rodgers case. 
The Oregon statute regarding g-ranting and revok-
ing license~ of insurance agents (Oregon Laws 1947, 
Chap. 373, p. 606) is substantially the same as the Utah 
statute on the same subject, 31-17-10, U.C.A., 1953, which 
provides as follows : 
31:..17-10. (1) Each insurer on appointing an 
agent in this state shall file written notice thereof 
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in duplicate with the commissioner on forms as 
prescribed and furnished by him, and shall pay 
the filing fee therefor as provided in section 
31-14-1 of this code. If then licensed, or as soon as 
licensed, the commissioner shall mail one copy of 
the appointment to the agent. 
(2) Each such appointment shall continue in 
force until: 
(a) the commissioner notifies the insurer that 
the agent's license is terminated or revoked; or 
(b) the appointment is revoked by the insurer 
by written notice of revocation filed with the com-
missioner on forms as prescribed and furnished 
by him, and by written notice to the agent (no fee 
shall be charged for filing notice of revocation) ; or 
(c) the insurer fails to renew the appointment 
as required by paragraph (3) of this section. 
( 3) * * ~ Prior to such first day of April the 
insurer shall file with the commissioner a state-
ment listing all its agency appointments in this 
state which are to be renewed, and listing sepa-
rately all its agency appointment in this state not 
to be renewed.~ "" • (Italics added) 
The pertinent provisions of this statute, insofar as 
the instant case is concerned, are to be found in subpara-
graph 1(b) and paragraph 3 thereof which provide that 
an agent's license may be revoked by the insurer by 
mererly giving notice of revocation in writing to the 
insurance commissioner. An insurance company is not 
obliged to maintain agents in its employ if it does not so 
wish. It is therefore to be noted that this revocation can 
be made at the pleasure of the insurer without stating 
any cause, and that the insurance commissioner is not 
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given any discretion in the matter, but must revoke as 
requested. 
During the trial of the instant case the Commis-
sioner of Insurance, the honorable Walter M. Jones was 
questioned by Court and by counsel regarding proced-
ure under the above statute: 
THE CouRT: The Company could have asked 
you to terminate it, and you would have done it 
without any cause stated~ 
MR. JONES: That is right, Sir, because his 
employment is based upon the will and pleasure 
of the company. (R-127) 
THE CouRT : In this case you used no discre-
tion whatever; you just followed the request of the 
company~ 
MR. JONES: That is right. (R-132) 
MR. BARKER: You would have to terminate, 
at the request of the company, the license of the 
agent, irregardless, would you not~ I mean, you 
could not leave a license for a company, if that 
company did not want him~ 
l\1R. JONES: I am sure that is so. (R-133) 
MR. BARKER: Mr. Jones, "'hen a company 
sends you a letter of termination, regardless of 
grounds, you terminate, do you not~ 
Mn. JONES: Yes, we have done. 
MR. BARKER : As a matter of fact, I believe 
you testified an agent could not sell for a company 
if they did not want him to, no matter what the 
grounds - if they did not like the color of his 
hair' 
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MR. JoNES: That is right. 
Mn. BARKER : And if the company does not 
want a license for him, you terminate the license T 
MR. JoNES: That is right. (R-137, 138) 
The Utah code, as well as the Oregon code, provides 
for hearings to be held by the Insurance Commissioner. 
Section 31-4-1, U.C.A., 1953, provides for hearings 
''upon written demand for a hearing made by any person 
aggrieved by any act or threatened act or failure of the 
Commissioner to act. . . . '' 
Section 31-4-4, U.C.A., 1953, provides that the com-
missioner may of his own initiative issue a show cause 
notice calling a hearing in which an agent would be re-
quired to show cause why action should not be taken 
against him. 
There is no provision in the code permitting an in-
& - ~ "illliiJ ~~ 
surance company to initlat.e ~"Z>l~!~~E!.~~~~--1!;~~--,o~K:-
grieved by some act or failure to_~~2!>1J.t~e co:mmlss,!o~~L 
and there is no provisio~"'~r an. _insu~a,~_9Q;rn:Q~l}}Y Jo" .,., 
be a party litigant in ~- ~-~~~~~g)p.vo!~~ng: !,!~~.,reyg.g~ti9J!. 
'""of an agent's license. 
,_. Wi 'l:r;u.~~ 
Moreover, the insurance commissioner did not re-
........ ,_ ~~~- ·.:~~ ·--·-·..,. 
gard the letter iri th~ inst~~.t~~~L~,J;~SL~,~§tto_cancel . 
Mortensen's and Treg~ay'~ license with Reliance Na-
~ ·.""---J" '''·' · :~.L"-'.;Ii;Jo~-..,.._-,...,..r,-;L-:c;.nr,~:~~"7lJY~"'.;~~7:'02frfl'l;"'.r_~~--::p·r:-;-o-,IO:-;~··;t,~~":"""'C'JP'qqof'l•Jl">'":..,.,~~l'!t 
tiona I. 
THE CouRT : In receiving that letter, did you 
interpret that to mean that you should have a 
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hearing and deprive them of their right to have a 
license permanently, that that was what was re-
quested of you~ 
MR. JONES: I did not at the time, Sir. I did 
not so interpret it. (R-140) 
MR. BARKER: Did you interpret this letter as 
a request on the behalf of Life Insurance Corpora-
tion of America that you revoke the licenses you 
had issued with the Reliance National Life Insur-
ance Company~ 
MR. JoNEs: No, Sir. 
Also, while the derogatory statements contained in 
the letter were sufficient to cause other insurance com-
panies to refuse to hire Mortensen and Tredway {R-89, 
312, 313, 315), they were not sufficient to cause the insur-
ance commissioner to take any affirmative action against 
them. 
THE CouRT: Now you stated in this letter 
you received from the plaintiffs - from Mr. Bul-
lard in this action, or the company, that there were 
three grounds set out. 
The first one you mentioned was they were 
not operating in the interests of the company. 
Is that sufficient grounds to terminate an 
agent's license if the company does not ask you 
to terminate it~ 
MR. JONES : No, I would not consider it so. 
I "\\rould \Yant to know the facts. 
THE CouR.T: The company could have asked 
you to terminate it, and you would have done it 
·'vithout any cause stated? 
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MR. JONES: That is right, Sir, because his 
employment is based upon the will and pleasure 
of the company. 
THE CouRT: Now the next ground that he 
had been operating in violation of the company op-
erations; that, of itself, would not bother you 
unless the company complained and did not want 
him any more~ 
MR. JoNES: That is right. That is the only 
way we would know about it. 
THE CouRT: And still it would not bother 
you, even if you did know about it, if the com-
pany was not complaining, would it Y If a citizen 
came in, or somebody else, and complained about 
it, they have a chance to get this man fired, you 
would not pay any attention to it unless the com-
pany wanted him fired on that ground 1 
MR. JONEs: That is right. 
THE CouRT : Now your third ground was you 
say they had in the letter there was a debit bal-
ance. That would not bother you either unless the 
company was complaining about it, would it? 
MR. JONES : Tha t is true, I am sure, Sir. 
(R-126, 127) 
THE CouRT: Now the fact that they were not 
desirable for any of these three grounds with this 
company, assuming that is a fact, how would that 
affect your giving them a license for another com-
pany; should you refuse them a license to work 
for another company on any one of these three 
grounds, or any of them~ 
MR. JONES: No, sir, not if we advise the com-
pany the termination of the prior employment was 
indicated by either one or all of those three. We 
would go ahead and license them. * * * ( R-128) 
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MR. BARKER: Mr. Jones, when a company 
sends you a letter of termination, regardless of 
grounds, you terminate, do you not~ 
MR. JoNES: Yes, we have done. 
MR. BARKER: As a matter of fact, I believe 
you testified an agent could not sell for a company 
if they did not want him to, no matter what the 
grounds - if they did not like the color of his 
hair~ 
MR. JONES: That is right. 
MR. BARKER : And if the company does not 
want a license for him, you terminate the license? 
MR. JoNES: That's right. 
MR. BARKER: If this letter contained any-
thing derogatory, material that was of such a na-
ture that you felt the agent could never again be 
relicensed, that would not come up again would it, 
unless the agent required another license? 
MR. JONES: That is right, it would not. 
MR. BARKER: And so it would sit 20 years, 
and there would never be a hearing unless some 
company put in a request to have that agent 
licensed~ 
~1R. JoNES: That is right. (R-137, 138) 
After hearing the testimony of the Insurance Com-
missioner the Court made the following ruling: 
''The Court is of the opinion on that matter that 
the letter 'vas written by the defendant, using the 
words '"\vith prejudice' and without a detailed ex-
planation was not sufficiently e lear to constitute a 
request for any more than a termination of the 
agency with the defendant company, and the Court 
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is of the opinion that it did not inaugurate a judi-
cial proceedings, and for that reason there is no 
privilege attached to this letter." (R-143) 
The Grubb v. Johnson case, supra, as previously 
stated, is identical to the instant case. In that ease an 
Insurance company had written a defamtory letter to 
the insurance commissioner requesting cancellation of an 
agent's license under a statute substantially the same as 
the Utah statute. In deciding the case the court stated 
as follows (89 P. 2d 1074): 
''The statute authorizes the insurance commis-
sioner to revoke a license or refuse to issue a li-
cense to a solicitor for cause. Oregon Laws 1947, 
Chapter 373, p. 605. But the statute also pro-
vides that the commissioner 'shall revoke any 
* * * solicitor's license upon the written re-
quest * * * of the employing agent or for failure 
to comply with the provisions of this act.' Oregon 
Laws 1947, Chapter 373, p. 606. The defendants 
had applied for a solicitor's license for plaintiff 
'that he may solicit * * * insurance solely on my 
behalf * * * unless sooner revoked.' The revoca-
tion notice on which the charge of libel is based 
stated, first of all, that the plaintiff 'has ceased 
to be a solicitor for the undersigned and you 
are hereby directed to revoke the license here-
tofore issued to said solicitor to solicit insurance 
on my behalf.' The revocation was automatic and 
mandatory. The commissioner had only a minis-
terial duty to perform. He testified that the no-
tice by the defendants 'constituted the revocation 
immediately.' Upon the revocation, which oc-
curred merely because of the termina.tion of plain-
tiff's employment, there was no matter on which 
to exercise quasi judicial power, and would be 
none unless at some later time application should 
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be made for a new license. The evidence shows 
that after the revocation an insurance company 
applied for an agent's license for Mr. Grubb. He 
had previously had only a solicitor's license. 
When the application was made the insurance 
company asked for a hearing 'to clear the record 
of Mr. Grubb,' and a hearing was held. After the 
revocation and before the request for a hearing, 
there was no issue before the commissioner, a;nd 
the revocation cannot be deemed a request or 
prayer for a hearing. True, the defendants wrote 
'It is my recommendation, based upon these mis-
appropriations that Franc-is W. Grubb be denied 
any further license or privilege granted by the In-
surance Commissioner of the State of Oregon.' 
But, in so writing, they were 1nere volunteers. 
That recommendation was applicable only to a 
situation which was then nonexistent. No hearing 
was possible unless and until some one again ap-
plied for a license for the plaintiff. The 'Revoca-
tion of Solicitor's License' was no part of a quasi 
judicial proceeding and the doctrine of absolute 
privilege was not applicable." (Italics added) 
It is respectfully submitteo that if any privilege at-
tached to the publication in the instant case, that privilege 
was only qualified or conditional, and the defense of qual- .. 
ified privilege \vas lost upon a showing that the pu2lica;, 
tion was made with malice. 
The letter from Licoa did not mention any other in-
surance company or request that plaintiffs' licenses be 
canceled with auy other company. The letter only re-
quested that which the company had an absolute right to 
request, namely, that the commissioner cancel Morten-
sen's and Tredway's licenses \vith Licoa. This the com-
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missioner had to do regardless of the reasons stated, and 
he was given no discretion in the matter by the insurance 
code. Thus, his act was purely ministerial in nature, and 
the letter was protected, if at all, only by a qualified or 
conditional privilege. 
CONCLUSION 
''The law holds good character in high esteem.'' It 
·would be ''a dangerous and vicious thing to license peo-
ple to write and speak without restraint.'' there being 
many ''who would shelter if they could under the protec-
tion afforded by absolute privilege and give free bridle 
to tongue and pen to injure or destroy an enemy.'' 
In the instant case the jury found that the defend-
ants deliberately and maliciously defamed the respond-
ents. Their malicious act was done for the express pur-
pose of destroying plaintiff's earning power. 
The defenq~nts h8;':~ .. not sou,9]1t to ju~!!~.~-,. they. 
act or even to deny the evidence of their malice. Their 
e - , . ) '#«#' -,. AA!it -'WY"' ........... d· tM h,·..,. -~. L *1L4§w . ' -~ ~~~,...:.....-~! 
only defense has been to seek "shelter * • * under the 
protection afforded by absolute privilege.'' 
However, this "shelter" is not available to defend-
ants in the instant case. The publication which maliciously 
defamed the plaintiffs was contained in a routine request 
for a ministerial act. The request made to cancel plain-
tiffs' licenses was made pursuant to a statutory pro-
vision of the insurance code, a provision which gives no 
discretion to the Insurance Commissioner, and which 
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requires no cause to be shown in order for the request to 
be granted. The Commissioner's act in canceling Morten-
sen's and Tredway's licenses with Licoa was mandatory, 
purely ministerial, and the letter requesting the minis-
terial act was protected, if at all, only by a qualified or 
conditional privilege which was destroyed on the show-
ing of actual malice. 
The defamatory statements made by the defendants. 
were gratuitous and without purpose insofar as the func-
tions of the Insurance Commissioner were concerned. 
This being so, what social objective would conceivably 
be furthered by a ruling of absolute privilege? While 
reputations may sometimes be fit subjects of sociological 
sacrifice, they should not be sacrificed needlessly. 
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the judg-
ment of the district court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLYDE & MECHAM 
By James L. Barker, Jr. 
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Attorney for Respondents. 
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